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I. INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute settlement systemI is
one of the most active forums in the field of public international law.2 By and
I The WTO's dispute settlement system is governed by the Dispute Settlement
Understanding and is administered by the Dispute Settlement Body: a division within the WTO
made up of all member states that is charged with forming panels when complaints are brought
1
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large, the WTO provides an arena for members to bargain with each other for
binding commitments to change trade policies for the welfare of other member
states. Thus, to help enforce such commitments, the WTO's dispute settlement
system was created. Rules, not power, are meant to be the foundation for the
system. 4 It is a mechanism to resolve disputes between members arising from
legal obligations under WTO law.' By providing such a venue, the system
discourages members from taking unilateral actions against each other-hence,
"provid[ing] security and predictability" among all trading partners.6 The
judicialization of the international trade dispute settlement procedures has
helped improve compliance with member states' trade obligations.7 In fact,
many observers believe it has been remarkably effective in maintaining
stability in the international trading system.
8
On the other hand, the system is often faced with criticism. Some
believe the panel and appellate decisions made in the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) 9 are incoherent and serve no precedential value.1° Others strongly argue
by members against other members, adopting the reports submitted by the panels and the
Appellate Body, approving retaliatory trade action by a winning complainant against a losing
defendant, generally monitoring compliance of trade commitments by members. Peter M.
Gerhart & Archana Seema Kella, Power and Preferences: Developing Countries and the Role of
the WTO Appellate Body, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 515, 516 n.2 (2005).
2 Niall P. Meagher & David Palmeter, World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement, in THE
PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 1201 (Kenneth A. Reinert & Ramkishen S.
Rajan eds., 2009). In 2012 alone, 27 complaints were initiated by members, 11 panels were
formed, and 18 panel reports and 11 Appellate Body reports were adopted. WTO, WTO ANNUAL
REPORT 2013, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/anrep-e/anrepl3-
chap5_e.pdf.
3 Gerhart & Kella, supra note 1, at 523.
4 AUTAR KRISHEN KOUL, GUIDE TO THE WTO AND GATT: ECONOMICS, LAW, AND POLITICS
45 (2005).
5 Donald McRae, Measuring the Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 3
ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (2008) (proposing that the United States hoped to
bind other members to resolve their differences, while the EU and Japan sought to protect
themselves from U.S. unilateral action under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act).
6 Id.
7 Dr. Bernhard Zangl argues that the emergence of judicial international dispute settlement
procedures, particularly in the WTO, appears to have increased states' likelihood of compliance
of their external legal obligations. Bernhard Zangl, Judicialization Matters! A Comparison of
Dispute Settlement Under GATT and the WTO, 52 INT'L STUD. Q. 825, 826 (2008). Studying the
United States' dispute settlement behavior during GATT and after the creation of the WTO, he
concluded that there is strong evidence that the judicialized WTO dispute settlement system was
more effective at gaining compliance than the diplomatic system under GATT. Id. at 827.
8 See, e.g., Meagher & Palmeter, supra note 2, at 1201.
9 The Dispute Settlement Body is one of the important bodies of the World Trade
Organization that is responsible for administering the rules of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. KoUL, supra note 4, at 34. As discussed in more detail in Parts II.B-C below, the
2
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that the system is significantly biased against developing countries. These
critics believe a bias exists because the dispute settlement system does not
effectively deal with power or capacity imbalances between wealthy states and
poorer states, thus deterring the latter from filing complaints against the
former. 11
First, less developed countries lack the power to negotiate on an equal
footing with their rich counterparts. 12 Furthermore, smaller countries may fear
the possibility of economic and political retaliation in response to pursuing
their complaints-preventing them from fully participating in the system.'
Second, developing countries tend to lack the institutions, people, or finances to
"identify, analyze, pursue, and litigate a dispute."' 14 Essentially, prosecuting a
complaint in the DSB is a long, complex process that requires a high level of
expertise in WTO law, and developing countries do not have the resources to
compete.' 5 As such, the system discriminates against less developed countries
by giving the wealthy unfair advantages.
At the same time, other scholars argue that no substantial bias truly
exists, and that the frequency of participation in the dispute settlement system
is actually determined by a country's volume of trade.' 6 In other words,
DSB is charged with establishing panels, adopting the panel and Appellate Body reports,
monitoring the implementation of those decisions, appointing Appellate Body members, and
authorizing the "suspension of trade concessions and other obligations." Id.
10 KOUL, supra note 4, at viii-ix.
I See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity Constraints:
The Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 557
(2005); Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis & Hhkan Nordstr6m, Is the Use of the WTO Dispute
Settlement System Biased?, in CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH DISCUSSION PAPERS
(C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers No. 2340, 1999); see also Fabien Besson & Racem Mehdi, Is WTO
Dispute Settlement System Biased Against Developing Countries? An Empirical Analysis, Second
International Conference on 'European and International Political & Economic Affairs,' Athens,
Greece (2004), available at http://ecomod.net/sites/default/files/document-conference/ecomod
2004/199.pdf.
12 Guzman & Simmons, supra note 11, at 559.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 559.
15 Id. at 566.
16 In their 2003 study, Dr. Peter Holmes, Prof. Jim Rollo, and Prof Alasdair Young found
that, statistically, the most active participants in the WTO dispute settlement system tended to be
those with the largest volume of global trade. Peter Holmes, Jim Rollo, and Alasdair R. Young,
Emerging Trends in WTO Dispute Settlement: Back to the GATT? 5 (The World Bank
Development Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3133, 2003), available at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/exter/al/default/0DSContentServer/lW3P/iB/2003/10/03/
000094946 030 92 310565344/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf For example, the United States
and the EU were a party to a dispute approximately 60% of the time. Matthew C. Turk, Why
2014]
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developing countries participate at a much lower rate because they have less at
stake economically. And yet, at least one commentator argues that reputational
costs, 17 not economic factors, are primary considerations in deciding whether to
litigate a dispute.1 8 The risk of losing reputation, not the fear of institutional
bias, keeps countries from filing frivolous claims. 19 In deciding whether to file
a complaint, developing countries must ask the same question as developed
countries: are the risks to reputation outweighed by the potential benefits of
winning the case?
This Note argues that the system may-and, in fact, should-be used
to promote the interests of both developed and developing countries by looking
at the reputation factor as more than a potential cost. While reputation may be
at risk when filing a complaint, it can also provide a benefit. Filing a complaint
makes a statement to other members, both those involved in the suit and those
who are not.20 By declaring to others that trade violations are consistently
unacceptable, developing countries can demonstrate a willingness to participate
and to help strengthen the trading system as a whole. This is not to say that
filing a complaint should be a developing country's first resort-in fact, all
other avenues of negotiating a dispute should first be exhausted-but when
those methods fail, a country should pursue its rights under the WTO system.
In this manner, these members will foster reputations as assertive and
dependable trading partners. At the same time, developed countries would reap
the benefits of dynamic trading partners that feel more included and, therefore,
more willing to cooperate. In other words, instead of providing a biased arena
where only the largest economies can fully address their disagreements, the
WTO dispute settlement system may be capable of promoting development
through trade disputes.
In support of this argument, this Note will study the case of Costa Rica,
a small country-both in population and in physical size-whose conscious
decisions to actively participate in the WTO and the dispute settlement system
have helped produce positive outcomes. 2
Does the Complainant Always Win at the WTO?: A Reputation-Based Theory of Litigation at the
World Trade Organization, 31 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 385, 393 (2011).
17 Turk, supra note 16, at 388. Turk proposes that a country's reputation within the
international community plays a pivotal factor in deciding whether to file complaints in the DSB.
Id. at 388. It is concern for losing reputation that limits countries to filing only claims that they
are confident are meritorious-as evidenced by the 90% win rate for cases in the DSB. Id. at 387.
is Id. at 414.
19 Id. at 414-15.
20 Id.
21 See, e.g., Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements Notified to the WTO,
WORLDTRADELAW.NET, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/databases/flas.php (last visited Nov. 6,
2014) (discussing the multiple Regional Trade Agreements Costa Rica has been a part of in the
last couple of decades).
(Vol. 117
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Part II of this Note provides a relatively detailed background of the
WTO and the dispute settlement system for two reasons: (1) to introduce the
unique attributes of a system, which is largely unfamiliar to those outside of the
field; and (2) to support the assertion that the dispute settlement process is full
of complexities that may be daunting for smaller WTO members. Part II.A
provides the history of the WTO and the formation of the new dispute
settlement system, and Parts II.B and II.C provide step-by-step descriptions of
how a dispute progresses in the DSB and what entities are involved at each
stage. The claims of bias based on power and capacity imbalances are
presented in Part III.A. In contrast to the bias claim, Part III.B describes how
the correlation between share of the volume of trade and levels of participation
could explain why developing country participation in the system is relatively
low. Part III.C explains the reputation-based theory, formulated by Matthew
Turk,23 that argues that concerns over reputation are a major influence over
24whether or not to bring a claim. The second part of Part III.C takes the
reputational effect theory further to argue why developing countries should
bring meritorious claims to improve their reputation. Part III.D presents a case
study of Costa Rica: a small, developing country whose participation in the
WTO and the WTO's dispute settlement system has helped build its reputation
to the point that it has been offered admission into the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
II. BACKGROUND: THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM ORIGINS AND
CURRENT FRAMEWORK
Although the work of the dispute settlement system represents only a
portion of the activities in the WTO, it seems to garner the largest share of the
attention from scholarly articles discussing the organization. 25 The dispute
settlement system consists of a set of rules-known as the Dispute Settlement
22 The Note later argues that these claims of bias are more of an obstacle of perception rather
than substance. In other words, the fear that power or capacity imbalances will affect a poor
country's ability to litigate complaints is more of an impediment to participation than the alleged
imbalances.
23 Matthew Turk is an attorney for Sullivan & Cromwell LLP-one of the most prestigious
international law firms in the world. Vault Law 100, VAULT.COM, http://www.vault.com/
rankings-reviews/company-rankings/law/vault-law-100.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (ranking
Sullivan & Cromwell the fourth most prestigious firm in the world). His theory of reputation-
based litigation in the WTO dispute settlement system will be discussed below.
24 Turk, supra note 16, at 388. In his article, Turk seeks to explain the high win rates in WTO
cases and concludes that countries are highly selective about their claims-bringing only the
most meritorious complaints. Id. The cost-benefit analysis is based on the reputational effects of
winning or losing the case: the effect on the reputation of the opponent. Id.
25 See McRae, supra note 5, at 2 n. 1.
2014]
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Understanding (DSU)-that are administered by the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB). The DSB, through the DSU, has the authority to establish panels; select
the sitting members of the Appellate Body; adopt panel and Appellate Body
reports; and, if necessary, permit the use of retaliatory measures.' The system
is one of the more exceptional aspects of the World Trade Organization
because it serves a uniquely judicial function. 7 In fact, it is widely considered
to be the international tribunal that "most... resembles a domestic court"
because it exercises compulsory jurisdiction over all members, uses panels that
resemble a trial court and a separate and permanent appeals system, and makes
legally-binding decisions.28
The only international courts that resemble the WTO dispute settlement
system are the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the European Court of
Justice (ECJ), and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).29 Like the
DSB, all three exercise some form of compulsory jurisdiction, hear cases on a
regular basis, and give out binding decisions. 30 However, the ICJ's compulsory
jurisdiction only applies to certain states, and the ECJ and ECHR are bodies
within a governmental structure-the EU.31
The WTO's dispute settlement system is governed by a framework
established by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, which is universally known as the Dispute Settlement
Understanding.32 First, the system operates under clearly defined procedural
rules that include establishing timelines and creating panels.33 Second, the
system also includes an appeals process for when either side disagrees with the
ruling.34 Third, unlike some other areas of international law, the DSB's
decisions have a relatively high rate of compliance by losing parties.35
Although under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dispute
settlement system nearly 90% of panel reports were accepted by both parties,
that system allowed losing parties to essentially block any adverse rulings with
26 Gerhart & Kella, supra note 1, at 516 n.2.
27 Id. at 516-17.
28 Turk, supra note 16, at 386-87.
29 Id. at 395.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 395 n.58.
32 Gerhart & Kella, supra note 1, at 516 n.2.
33 Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, WTO http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
whatise/tife/displ-e.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) [hereinafter Understanding the WTO].
34 Id.
35 McRae, supra note 5, at 3.
[Vol. 117
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ease-in fact, there was a growing trend in the 1980s to block such reports.36
Rulings under the WTO system became much more robust, making it more
difficult for losing parties to avoid compliance. 37 Equally, the judicialization of
the process-that is the move to make dispute settlement a legal rather than
diplomatic process-arguably has helped in garnering compliance from
member states. 38 For those reason, the WTO views its dispute settlement
system as a "central pillar" of the organization.39
The parts below discuss the WTO dispute settlement system in greater
detail. Part II.A provides a history of the organization since its previous
inception as the International Trade Organization. Part II.B covers the
development of the dispute settlement system after the GATT years. Finally,
Part II.C presents the framework under which the system works, outlining the
process of litigating a complaint in the DSB from start to finish.
A. The Uruguay Rounds: The Origins of the WTO and the Dispute
Settlement Body
The Dispute Settlement Body came about as a result of the Uruguay
Round4° with the creation of the WTO.4' While the prior rounds covered tariff
issues almost exclusively, the agenda for the Uruguay Round also included
discussions on dispute settlement, non-tariff barriers, natural resources,
agriculture (one of the biggest points of contention), textiles, anti-dumping,
subsidies, intellectual property, services, and the GATT system.42 Out of the
36 DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 9 (2d ed. 2004).
37 McRae, supra note 5, at 3. But see, C. O'Neal Taylor, Impossible Cases: Lessons from the
First Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 309, 319 (2007). Taylor
argues that even under the DSU, a losing country's political will still determines whether or not it
will comply. Id. Thus, it may still refuse to comply with panel or Appellate Body decisions if the
benefits of continuing the prohibited action outweigh the possible repercussions. Id.
38 Zangl, supra note 7, at 826.
39 Understanding the WTO, supra note 33.
40 WTO Rounds are multilateral trade negotiations involving several trade issues that can take
place over years and in multiple locations. Each trade round is named after the place where it
begins, not necessarily where it ends. The Uruguay Round was the eighth round since the signing
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT, in 1946. Timeline: World Trade
Organization, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country-profiles/2430089.stm (Feb.
15, 2012, 11:31 GMT). It was thought to be the longest, most contentious, and most expansive
multilateral trade round in the history of the GATT. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 36, at
11. Out of the final agreements to come out of the round, the most significant accomplishment
was the creation of the World Trade Organization.
41 Taylor, supra note 37, at 311.
42 The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, WTO, http://www.wto.org/English/
thewtoe/whatise/tife/fact4_e.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
2014]
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final agreements to come out of the round, the most significant accomplishment
was the creation of the World Trade Organization-the reincarnation of the ill-
fated Bretton Woods organization, 43 the International Trade Organization
(ITO).'
The GATT Secretariat that administered the GATT agreements prior to
the formation of the WTO was less like a formal organization and more like a
provisional body. The WTO, on the other hand, has a formal structure and
multiple bodies.45 The WTO Secretariat, headed by the Director General,
carries out administrative functions for the WTO and has no decision-making
powers.46 The top governing body of the organization is the Ministerial
Conference, which is made up of trade ministers from each member state.47 It
meets at least once every couple of years and makes the final determinations on
major policy issues.48 Since such agreements must be made by consensus, the
operational decisions are generally relegated to the General Council.
49
The General Council consists of permanent representatives from the
member states that handle the day-to-day matters for the organization.50 The
Council also oversees most of the other bodies of the WTO: the Trade Policy
Review Body; the Councils on Trade in Goods, on Trade in Services, and on
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; the
43 The Bretton Woods Conference was held to create international agreement for a new
method of currency exchange that tied other currencies to the U.S. Dollar. M.J. Stephey, A Brief
History of Bretton Woods System, TIME (Oct. 21, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/business/
article/0,8599,1852254,00.html. The conference took place in 1944, toward the end of World
War I, and was joined by 44 nations. Id. It is best known for having resulted in the creation of
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Id. These organizations are commonly
known as Bretton Woods organizations.
44 The creation of the WTO was a watershed moment because it was nearly 49 years in the
making. In 1946, the International Trade Organization (ITO), the failed precursor of the WTO,
was formulated with the intention of making it the third Bretton Woods organization. PALMETER
& MAVROIDIS, supra note 36, at 1-2. The ITO was too ambitious for the U.S. Congress and thus
suffered a quick demise; however, the GATT agreement survived and remains the backbone of
the WTO. Id. at 2.
45 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, 109-111 (2d ed. 1997) (comparing
the WTO's rule based system after the Uruguay Round with the power-oriented system of
GATT).
46 KOUL, supra note 4, at 35.
47 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 36, at 14.
48 KoUL, supra note 4, at 33.
49 Id.
50 Id.
[Vol. 117
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Committees on Trade and Development and on Trade and the Environment;
and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 51
The DSB is comprised of representatives from every member state, and
it serves as a forum for all trade matters in dispute.52 Furthermore, the body has
a significant amount of power over specific disputes between individual WTO
members. Not only does the DSB establish panels for disputes and decide
whether or not to adopt panel reports, but it also has the authority to allow the
winning party of a dispute to temporarily retaliate against the losing party if the
latter fails to abide by the DSB's ruling in a timely manner. 3 The framework
for how the DSB system carries out those duties is discussed below.
B. The Dispute Settlement Mechanism: The DSB Under the DSU
The present dispute settlement system came about as a result of a series
of agreements: the 1979 Understanding on Dispute Settlement, the 1989
Dispute Settlement Procedure Improvements Agreement, and the 1994 Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU). 54 The current jurisdictional and institutional
scope for the DSB is based on these agreements, particularly the DSU.55 It is
especially unique in the realm of public international law because it most
closely resembles domestic court systems,56 and it gives the DSB compulsory
jurisdiction over any and all trade disputes among members.5 7 In other words,
member states are bound to give the DSB the authority to decide such disputes
51 Id. The Trade Policy Review Body reviews the trade policy of WTO Members under the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TRPM). Id. The Council on Trade in Goods oversees the
activities of 12 committees: Agriculture, Antidumping Practices, Customs Valuation, Import
Licensing Procedures, Information Technology, Market Access, Rules of Origin, Safeguards,
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Technical
Barriers to Trade, Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), and the Working Party on State
Trading Enterprises. Council for Trade in Goods, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/wto-multilateral-affairs/-world-trade-
organization/council-trade-goods (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). The Councils on Trade in Services
and on the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights administer the
GATS and TRIPS respectively. Id.; Council for Trade in Services, USTR, http://www.ustr.gov/
trade-agreements/wto-multilatera-affairs/-world-trade-organization/counci-trade-services (last
visited Oct. 5, 2014).
52 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 36, at 15.
53 Id.
54 Kara M. Reynolds, Why Are So Many WTO Disputes Abandoned?, in TRADE DISPUTES AND
THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE WTO 191, 193 (James C. Hartigan ed., 2009).
The DSU itself consists of 27 sections, 143 paragraphs, and four appendices. PALMETER &
MAVROIDIS, supra note 36, at 16.
55 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 36, at 16.
56 Turk, supra note 16, at 386-87.
57 McRae, supra note 5, at 4.
20141
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between them, as opposed to, for exampe, the International Court of Justice,
whose jurisdiction is based on consent.5 Additionally, the DSU establishes the
formation of a standing Appellate Body and contains the rules, procedures, and
timelines under which the DSB operates, which include the suggested timelines
for the dispute settlement process, the steps and guidelines for setting up
panels, the appellate process, and how the reports are implemented. 9
One of the more innovative procedural concepts in the DSU is that of
"negative consensus. 6 ° Under the GATT system, the reports of a panel and the
Appellate Body had to be adopted by "positive consensus"-meaning every
member of the DSB, and thus the WTO, needed to vote in favor of accepting
the ruling.6' Unfortunately, this meant that the losing party could essentially
veto any adverse report.6 To avoid making compliance voluntary, the DSU
now makes adoption of the report in effect automatic, unless every member
votes against it. 63 Thus, the negative consensus rule promotes a higher
likelihood of compliance by ensuring that panel and Appellate Body reports are
binding.
Disputes tend to be based on allegations of either policies or practices
that lead to increased protection of the defendant's industries that actively
compete with imports or failures to follow through on trade liberalizing
measures previously agreed upon.64 They are settled according to a timeline set
forth by the DSU that consists of a series of stages. 65 At the first stage, parties
to the dispute must first participate in "Consultations" wherein they attempt to
58 The ICJ has been recognized to have compulsory jurisdiction over states who have
acquiesced to such jurisdiction in writing. The United States, for example, has not recognized the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ; thus, the Court does not have compulsory jurisdiction over
any disputes brought by or against the United States. Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction
of the Court as Compulsory, I.C.J. (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) http://www.icj-cij.org/
jurisdiction/?p I =5&p 2=1 &p3=3.
59 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 36, at 15.
60 Id.
61 Id.; Understanding the WTO, supra note 33.
62 PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 36, at 15
63 Id.
64 Chad P. Bown, On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, 88 REv.
ECON. & STAT. 811 (2001). They generally deal with contract or commercial law matters (i.e.
terms of contracts), trade barrier issues, intellectual property concerns (i.e. TRIPS), and tax law
variances (i.e. transfer pricing). Fernando Pi6rola, Senior Counsel for the Advisory Centre on
WTO Law, Lecture on WTO Dispute Settlement, Geneva, Switzerland, (June 27, 2013).
Regarding trade barrier disputes, the specific issues under contention tend to include anti-
dumping, zeroing, countervailing measures, and safeguards. Id.
65 Of course, if the complainant decides to withdraw the complaint at any moment or fails to
take steps to go on to the next stage, the process ends there. Bown, supra note 64, at 2.
[Vol. 117
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come up with a settlement through negotiations.66 The parties may have up to
60 days to settle the dispute before the next stage may be triggered.67 If the
Consultations fail, the complainant can decide to progress to the second stage.6 s
After the request is made to form the panel, the DSB has 45 days to
select the panelists. 63 Once the panel has been selected, it establishes its own
working procedures-supplementing the general procedures set out by the
DSU.70 Subsequently, the panel has six months to complete its final report to
the DSB, unless the parties agree to extend that time.71 After the panel reports
on its conclusions, the report becomes a ruling by the DSB unless negative
72 7consensus occurs. Either party can appeal the report to the Appellate Body.73
Appeals may last a maximum of 90 days, and once that decision has been made
the DSB can only reject it by consensus.74 Finally, if the defendant loses, it has
30 days to signal its intention to comply with the decision, followed by "a
reasonable period of time" to take actions to comply. 75
If the losing defendant fails to comply within that time, the DSB may
authorize remedies for the winning complainant in the form of compensation or
temporary suspension of concessions or obligations.76 Compensation refers to
the defendant reducing trade barriers or tariffs with the purpose of off-setting
the harm done by wrongful act.77 Under the DSU, refusal to comply even after
66 Meagher & Palmeter, supra note 2, at 1197. At the same time, by this stage, the parties
would have likely had informal consultations. Id. The formal negotiations can happen, either
bilaterally or with the assistance of the Director-General. Id. Third parties may also participate at
this stage, which often frustrates the possibilities of reaching a compromise due to the additional
competing interests. Understainding the WTO, supra note 33. Nonetheless, the member filing the
complaint can actually draft the request for consultations so as to block third party involvement.
Meagher & Palmeter, supra note 2, at 1198. Consultations serve to allow the parties to gather
information about the matter to decide whether to come up with a compromise or to proceed with
the next step. Id.
67 Reynolds, supra note 54, at 191 & n. 1.
68 Id.
69 Understanding the WTO, supra note 33.
70 Meagher & Palmeter, supra note 2, at 1198.
71 Understanding the WTO, supra note 33; see also Meagher & Palmeter, supra note 2, at
1199.
72 Meagher & Palmeter, supra note 2, at 1200.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1201. The "reasonable period of time" to comply may be determined by the arbitrator
when requested by the party demanding compliance. See, e.g., United States-Certain Country of
Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WTO, http://www.wto.org/englishltratop-e/dispue/
casese/ds384_e.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
76 Id.
77 Id.
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such remedies are imposed means that the complainant can demand sanctions,
wherein members-not parties to the dispute-will remove concessions;
however this option has never been used.78
The actual panel selection rules and procedures, the panel hearing and
decision-making process, the appellate review process, and the steps taken to
ensure compliance are complex and require some expertise to navigate. For that
reason, members on either side of a dispute need lawyers specializing in WTO
law to be successful. In fact, as discussed below in Part III.A, some
commentators have theorized that the level of expertise required in the process
and the capacity needed to possess that expertise create an unbalanced playing
field for developing countries that may lack the resources to competitively
represent their interest within the system. 79 Part II.C below explains some of
the more important stages of the panel, appeals, and remedies (compliance)
processes.
C. The Dispute Settlement Procedures: Panels, Appeals, and Compliance
Complainants in WTO disputes win at an extremely high rate in
relation to other types of litigation. 8° Unlike the persistent 50-50 rate found in
other forums, complainants in the WTO win at a rate of 90%.81 As Part III
discusses below, such results weaken the argument that the system is biased
due to the disparity in capacity between developed countries and developing.
This Part sets out in more detail the processes of panel formation, panel
and Appellate Body procedures, panel and Appellate Body reports, and
remedies and compliance. The main purpose of breaking the process down is to
provide a basic idea of the complexity of the process and explain why a high-
level of expertise is required to navigate it.
Part II.C.1 discusses the panel composition, the procedures for the
panel hearings, and the reports from the panel. Part II.C.2 presents the basics of
the Appellate Body procedure and reports. Finally, Part II.C.3 describes what
happens once the defendant is found to have violated a trade agreement.
1. Building a Panel
The member bringing a complaint may request the establishment of a
panel by submitting a formal, written request to the DSB.82 In doing so, the
member is fulfilling the due process step of advising the defendant and all other
78 Turk, supra note 16, at 391-92.
79 Guzman & Simmons, supra note 11, at 558-59.
80 Turk, supra note 16, at 387.
81 Id.
82 Meagher & Palmeter, supra note 2, at 1198.
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members that it intends to proceed with the complaint.83 In contrast to the
compulsory nature of the DSB's jurisdiction over trade disputes, the panel
selection process provides the parties with a significant amount of control. In a
way, the parties to a dispute can pick their own judges.
First, unlike most other international adjudicatory bodies, the panels do
not consist of a permanent body but are instead selected on an ad hoc basis. 84
Second, the parties may select the panelists from a list compiled by the
Secretariat. 85 In fact, there are two methods for composing a panel:
composition by agreement and composition by fiat.8 6 The former occurs when
the parties come to an agreement on the panelists; whereas, the latter results
from a failure to reach a mutually agreeable list, requiring the Director-General
to compose the panel under paragraph 7 of Article 8 of the DSU.87 Thus, the
method to be used depends on how well the parties can successfully negotiate a
compromise."
Arguably, the ability to select or reject panel candidates based on their
own criteria gives the parties a power analogous to the jury selection process in
the United States court system: once presented with the list of nominees, the
parties can evaluate each candidate and make choices strategically intended
improve the likelihood that the panel will side with them. 89
The strategic importance of this stage of the process is underscored by
the oft-contentious nature of the negotiations; 90 thus, advanced legal tactics and
planning are required to make the best choices. One caveat is that the
Secretariat generally does not pick candidates from the same country as the
parties. 9' In fact, in light of possible biases, when a developing country faces a
83 Id.
84 Andrew W. Shoyer, Panel Selection in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings, 6 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 203 (2003).
85 Id. at 204.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 205.
88 Id. at 204-05 The steps for a composition by agreement are outlined in the DSU. Initially,
the Secretariat compiles a list of candidates to present to the parties. Id. at 204. The list is created,
in conjunction with the Legal Affairs Division, by the division within the Secretariat that focuses
on the trade issue in dispute. Id. The Secretariat formulates a list--or a "slate"-that is most
likely to satisfy the criteria set out by the parties. Id. Often the Secretariat makes the nominations
with the understanding that the entire slate may be discarded; thus, it often keeps a few strong
candidates in its back pocket, so to speak, in case the Director-General must compose the panel
by fiat. Id. at 205.
89 Id. at 205.
90 See id. at 205-06.
91 Id. at 204 Granted this limitation would seem obvious in order to avoid an apparent bias by
the panelists; however, the parties can actually agree to make an exception to that rule. Id.
2014]
13
Holliday: Development Through Trade Disputes: Building a Reputation Using t
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2014
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
developed country, paragraph 10 of Article 8 of the DSU allows the former to
insist that at least one panelist be from a developing country. 92 The parties may
set criteria that can include insisting on specific credentials-for example, a
certain type of educational or work background-on specific language skills-
for example, fluency in English and Spanish-or on geographic or national
origin.93 The idea is that the selected panelists would either be biased for the
party's side or as neutral as possible.94
If the parties fail to reach a compromise on the composition of the
panel, either party can invoke the DSU rules to request that the Director-
General select the panel-also known as composition by fiat.95 It would be
inaccurate to assert that at this point the parties have relinquished all control
over the panel selections. In fact, the Director-General must still consult with
the parties and rely on their criteria when composing the panel.9 6 Additionally,
the Director-General is under pressure to put together a panel that can in no
way appear to be biased.97
When the contentious but important process of selecting a panel is
complete the complaint proceeds on to the hearing stage. Usually, two meetings
are held with the panel and the parties.98 First, the parties present their case to
the panel in writing followed by the initial hearing wherein the complaining
country presents the basis of its complaint and the responding party makes its
defense. 99 Second, the parties rebut the prior arguments through written
rebuttals and oral arguments.'00 The parties require the assistance of highly-
skilled attorneys, deeply familiar with WTO law, to effectively navigate these
hearings.
The panels may ask questions by interrupting the oral arguments,
waiting for one of both parties to finish, or by presenting only written questions
to the parties. 0 ' Third, the panel may request expert opinions for any technical
or scientific points brought up. 10 2 The panel may also request information from
92 Id. at 205-06. The concept is that if the panelist comes from a developing country, it will
provide the developing country party a more sympathetic ear. Id.
93 Id. at 205.
94 See id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 207.
97 See id.
98 Meagher & Palmeter, supra note 2, at 1199.
99 Understanding the WTO, supra note 33.
1oo Id.
101 Meagher & Palmeter, supra note 2, at 1199.
102 ,..
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an expert or an expert review group.103 Other members may participate as third
parties if they file a notification of their intent to do so within ten days of the
panel formation. 10 4 Third party participation is generally limited to receiving
the initial submissions made by the parties, and perhaps attending the first
meeting of the panel. 105
Fourth, after debating amongst itself and reaching a conclusion, the
panel submits to both parties a series of reports (first draft, intermediate report,
and final draft) and allows time for a response. 10 These reports are supposed to
be confidential, but often they are made available to the press by one or both of
the parties. Fifth, the final draft is submitted to all other WTO members and, if
the panel concludes there was a violation of an existing trade obligation, it maY
recommend how the defendant may comply with its prior trade agreements.
Finally, barring an unlikely consensus within the DSB-since every member,
including the winner, would have to vote against it-the report is accepted as
the DSB's ruling. 10 8 However, either party has the right to appeal the panel's
decision to the Appellate Body.
2. The Appellate Body
The Appellate Body is unique amongst international forums because it
follows principles of common law as opposed to civil law. 109 In other words, it
uses many of the substantive and procedural standards used in common law
court systems-particularly the concept of due process." 0 One major
difference, however, is that unlike common law appellate courts, the Appellate
Body cannot remand a case to the panel if it modifies any of the panel's
103 Id. Under Article 13.2 of the DSU, a panel that finds it necessary to consult with experts to
be able to "make an objective assessment of the facts... may consult either individual experts or
appoint an expert review group to prepare an advisory report." WTO Bodies Involved in the
Dispute Settlement Process, WTO http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/disp-settlement
cbt.e/c3s6pl-e.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2014) (citation omitted).
104 Meagher & Palmeter, supra note 2, at 1199.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See id. at 1200.
108 Id.
109 Surya P. Subedi, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism as a New Technique for Settling
Disputes in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: NEW
PROBLEMS AND TECHNIQUES 173 (Duncan French et al. eds., Hart Publishing 2010). The I.C.J.,
for example, is based on civil law principles. Id.
110 John P. Gafffiey, Due Process in the World Trade Organization: The Need for Procedural
Justice in the Dispute Settlement System, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1173, 1175-76 (1999).
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findings.I"l Furthermore, it possesses its own secretariat and is largely separate
from the rest of the WTO structure.'
12
Unlike the ad hoc panel compositions, the Appellate Body consists of
seven permanent members. 1 3 These permanent members are selected by the
DSB and are intended to be geographically representative of the WTO
membership.11 4 They have no government affiliations and all members are
respected within the field of international trade law.11 5 Membership in the
Appellate Body is for a four-year term. 116
When any party appeals a panel report, the appeal is presented before
three of the seven members of the Body, picked by rotation.17 Since any
member can sit on any appeal depending on rotation, a member may be from
the same country as one of the parties.' 8 As is the case with many common law
appellate courts, the Appellate Body only considers arguments based on the
points of law and legal interpretations in the panel report instead of questioning
the factual findings of the panel.11 9 Thus, the three members must decide
whether to uphold, modify, or reverse the panel report, and their report is then
submitted to the DSB for acceptance. 120 Once more, that decision is put to a
vote that would require negative consensus to reject. 121
3. Compliance: The Dispute Is Over... What Now?
Once the panel and appeals processes are completed-and if the
defendant loses-there is still the challenging task of obtaining compliance
from the losing party. The panel and Appellate Body reports recommend that
the offending country conform to the WTO agreement at issue, but the
implementation of the recommendations need only prevent future harm and not
redress past injury. 122 That party has a generous amount of time to attempt to
III Meagher & Palmeter, supra note 2, at 1200.
112 Id. at 1199.
113 Id.
114 id.
115 Understanding the WTO, supra note 33.
116 Meagher & Palmeter, supra note 2, at 1199.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 1200.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
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change its current policies that were found in violation, but it has thirty days to
signal to the DSB an intention to do so. 123
If the losing party does not want to carry out such changes, the parties
must then meet to decide what form of compensation will be offered. 12 4 For
example, the defendant can offer the complainant a reduction in tariffs in a
different trade sector, or some other concession. 1 25 However, when a losing
defendant fails to takes steps to comply with the final decision, or the steps it
takes do not satisfy the complainant, that complainant may request permission
from the DSB to exercise its right to impose temporary retaliatory trade
measures against the defendant called "cross-retaliation." 126
Retaliatory measures may include temporary suspension of existing
trade concessions or obligations. 127 The defendant has the ability to challenge
the retaliation by requesting arbitration. 128 The arbitration serves to determine
whether the plaintiff followed the rules when setting the measures and whether
the level of retaliation was proper. 129 Proportionality is the important factor in
determining if a retaliatory measure is appropriate. 130 In other words, the
suspension of concessions must be proportionate to the harm done to the
complainant.
Ironically, after all is said and done, there is agreement by many
economists that retaliatory action does not tend to benefit, in any real way, the
domestic industries affected.' 31 There are multiple occasions wherein the
winning complainant was given the right to impose such measures, but refused
to do so.132 Given such facts, the question remains, why then-with so much
cost in time and resources to litigate these complaints-would any WTO
member undertake the process? Moreover, if there is little to gain and the
system is biased against developing countries, why would any developing
countries participate as complainants? Part III below analyzes whether or not
the system is actually biased, what alternative explanations there are for the low
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1201.
125 Id.
126 JEANNE J. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20088, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: AN OVERVIEW 4 (2006), available at http://www.fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/7491 0.pdf.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Meagher & Palmeter, supra note 2, at 1201.
131 Id.
132 Id.
2014]
17
Holliday: Development Through Trade Disputes: Building a Reputation Using t
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2014
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
participation rates from developing countries, and if the system is a viable tool
for development.
III. ANALYSIS
Greater participation in the World Trade Organization dispute
settlement system has the potential to improve trading relationships among all
members in a number of ways: Universal participation will lend the
organization as a whole added legitimacy. Developing countries can gain a
deeper understanding of the mechanics of international trade law. Further, as
this Note argues, developing countries can improve their reputation, which may
help their continued development in the long run. Lastly, even developed
countries benefit from more reliable trading partners who can establish
themselves as dependable.
However, the WTO is often accused of discriminating against
developing countries by only advancing the interests of the rich members-and
the dispute settlement system is not exempt from such criticisms. 133 The
common condemnation, in essence, is that WTO and the DSU are structured so
as to be disproportionately advantageous to the wealthiest members of the
WTO. The system prevents smaller, poorer members from being able to benefit
in the way it claims. Thus, according to this critique, the DSB gives the biggest
economies an unfair advantage.
First, Part III.A discusses the arguments that the dispute settlement
system is biased against developing countries based on power imbalances or
capacity imbalances. The principal claim is that the wealthiest members can use
their disproportionately-vast economic and political power to dissuade
developing countries from bringing complaints against them, and the
developing countries lack the capacity to effectively participate in WTO
disputes. 134 The power imbalance claim fails because developing countries
actually tend to litigate disputes more often against developed countries than
they do against other developing countries, 35 which should not occur if power
truly played a serious role. Additionally, the capacity imbalance argument,
although much more compelling, is also flawed. The availability of outside
133 See, e.g., DONATELLA ALESSANDRINI, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE MULTILATERAL
TRADE REGIME: THE FAILURE AND PROMISE OF THE WTO's DEVELOPMENT MISSION (2010); Anup
Shah, The WTO and Free Trade, GLOBALISSUES.ORG, http://www.globalissues.org/article/42/the-
wto-and-free-trade (last updated July 2, 2007).
134 Guzman & Simmons, supra note 11, at 559.
135 Id.
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resources, such as the Advisory Center of WTO Law (ACWL), 136 and the fact
that developing countries win as often as developed countries actually implies
that any capacity imbalance is more perceived than real. Furthermore, Parts
III.B and III.C demonstrate that there may be other factors explaining lower
participation by developing countries.
Second, Part III.B analyzes the claims that participation in the system
is not necessarily biased, but that it is related to the size of the member's share
of the total global trade-i.e. that the larger the share the more it participates-
looking particularly at the findings by Holmes, Rollo, and Young. 137 Thus, the
idea is that developing countries are less likely to participate because they have
less at stake.' 3 8 Although this Note does not debate the findings that share of
trade and amount of participation are correlated, it does argue against the
assumption that only economic benefits are at stake in WTO disputes.
Third, Part III.C looks at the relatively unmentioned reputational factor
behind the decision to bring a case before the DSB. This Part analyzes Matthew
Turk's reputation-based theory that reputational effects, not bias or share of
trade, determine whether a complaint is brought. A country's reputation is
negatively impacted if it loses a case either because it is found to be at fault or
because it has brought a non-meritorious complaint. 139 However, this Note
argues, aside from losing reputation, a winning complainant may also improve
its international reputation.
Finally, Part III.D presents the case of Costa Rica-a small country
with a nascent economy-and how its experience in the system implies a
possible benefit to developing countries for participating in the dispute
settlement system. Through its involvement in the WTO system and its
experience in the dispute settlement system, the country has succeeded in
establishing a reputation as a reliable trading partner and willing participant in
international trade. As a result, Costa Rica has managed to sign multiple
Regional Trade Agreements-including with the United States, the EU, and
China-and has recently received an invitation to join the prestigious
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Strengthening ties to the world's economic powerhouses will increase trade
activity and attract greater foreign investment, resulting in economic
development.
136 The ACWL is an agency independent from the WTO that provides developing countries
with free legal advice and training related to WTO Law. About Us: The ACWL's Mission,
ACWL.cH, http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/theacwl's_mission.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
137 See supra text accompanying note 16.
138 See supra Part II.C.3.
139 Turk, supra note 16, at 388.
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A. Challenges to Participation: Power and Capacity
As mentioned above, the dispute settlement process can be complex
and requires extensive expertise to navigate. 140 Some recent writing on the
WTO's dispute settlement system argues that developing countries lack the
power to either negotiate effectively during the Consultation stage or to
guarantee that they do not face retaliation for the dispute itself, and that they
have a shortage of capacity to deal with the disputes in terms of financial
resources and know-how. 14 1 While on its face, this argument makes sense,
some studies have found that the power and capacity hypotheses do not hold
up. 142 However, this Part discusses these arguments because of their
prevalence, with the thought that perhaps the perception of bias may be nearly
as strong as the reality.
As with any litigation, the decision to take action is largely a cost-
benefit analysis. 143 Part III.A.1 covers the theory that a defendant's power to
impose political and economic retaliation on the complainant, outside of the
trade regime, may be a considerable cost that generates developing countries'
unwillingness to file complaints in the DSB. Part III.A.2 discusses the theory
that a state that lacks qualified individuals specializing in the area trade law,
that have less experienced institutions to handle trade matters, and that have
fewer financial resources to deal with trade dispute issues face higher costs and
thus fewer benefits. 144
Overall, one main reason both theories fail is because they base their
findings solely on the possible tangible benefits (i.e. short-term economic) that
a complainant may gain from winning a dispute. As discussed in Part III.C
below, the gain or loss of reputation is likely a much more compelling reason
for bringing the case.
1. The Power Imbalance
The argument that a power imbalance creates a serious disadvantage
for a developing country bringing a complaint against a developed country is
two-fold: first, the small developing country lacks the leverage to receive
140 See supra Part II.B.
141 Guzman & Simmons, supra note 11, at 557.
142 For example, Guzman and Simmons determined that from their study that power does not
play a strong role in who participates; although, they find that capacity is important. Guzman &
Simmons, supra note 11. However, Holmes, Rollo, and Young found share of global trade,
instead, to be the main determining factor. HOLMES ET AL., supra note 16. Turk asserts that
reputational costs are a countries biggest concern when filing a complaint. Turk, supra note 16.
143 Guzman & Simmons, supra note 11, at 559.
'44 Id. at 557.
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favorable terms from a dispute Consultation; second, the wealthy country's
ability to retaliate against the poorer one is greater than any possible benefit the
poorer would receive if it were to win the complaint. In other words, a wealthy
country has more power to hurt the smaller country than the smaller country
has to hurt the richer "through trade, foreign aid, or other areas of international
relations."' 145 Given that the developing country is more likely to have a greater
reliance on trade with the developed country than the other way around, the
latter has the ability to punish the former for bringing the dispute. 146
Trade disputes do not happen in a vacuum. There are other avenues
outside the DSB in which a trade dispute can play out. 147 The power hypothesis
points out that in retaliation for dragging it in front of a panel, a developed
country has the ability to punish the developing country in two general ways:
(1) by political retaliation, and (2) by economic retaliation. 148
Political retaliation can come in the form of a diplomatic backlash in
ways that may even seem unrelated. 149 For example, treaty negotiations on
some separate issue could suddenly fall through after the complaint is filed.
Economic retaliation could also be just as harmful. The developed country can
retaliate on a developing one, for instance, in the form of the withdrawal of
some form of aid or some other preferential treatment. 50 A poor country that
depends on the financial assistance of a wealthy country may be reticent to file
a complaint if they believe that aid would be withdrawn as a result. Thus, one
would expect that the more power the richer country has over the poorer
country, the less likely it that the poorer one would file a complaint against
it.1
51
As feasible as the theory may seem to explain the motivation behind a
developing country's participation in the system, the data gathered by Dr.
Andrew Guzman15' and Dr. Beth Simmons 153demonstrates otherwise. 154 Their
141 Id. at 569.
146 id.
147 Turk, supra note 16, at 422.
148 Besson & Mehdi, supra note 11, at 4.
149 Id. at 12.
151 ld. at 11.
151 Guzman & Simmons, supra note 11, at 569.
152 Dr. Guzman is a professor of law from Berkeley Law School, has a J.D. and Ph.D. from
Harvard, and has focused much of his writing on international trade law issues. Berkeley Law -
Faculty Profiles, BERKELEY LAW http://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/faculty/faculty
Profile.php?faclD=583 (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
153 Dr. Simmons is a professor of International Affairs in Harvard University's Department of
Government, is the Director of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard
University, and has a Ph.D. from Harvard. People, HARVARD UNIV. http://www.gov.harvard.edu/
people/faculty/beth-simmons (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
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findings actually suggest that poor countries were more likely to avoid filing
complaints against poorer countries and instead file them against richer
countries.155 Such results would seem to show that developing countries do not
consider the possibility of retaliation in order to decide whether or not to file a
complaint-or at least it is not the determinative factor. The question is, what is
their main concern, then? Another alternative is presented below.
2. The Capacity Imbalance
A second argument that developing countries face discrimination in the
dispute settlement system is based on the presumption that they lack the
capacity to successfully litigate or defend a complaint. 156 Capacity refers to the
institutional, financial, and human resources needed to fully participate in a
DSB case.' 57 Hence, this time, the developing country is at a disadvantage with
respect to developed countries because they lack the funds and the expertise to
win their case. Threats to resort to the DSB miss credibility when countries do
not have the ability to mobilize the legal resources necessary to carry out the
dispute through to the end. 58
Here, Drs. Guzman and Simmons assert that their findings show that
poor states have limited resources that they will use strategically; therefore,
wealthy states tend to be willing to file complaints against a broader range of
defendants while poor states tend to be reluctant to file against other poor
states-indicating the bias that benefits develop countries. 1 Because of their
limited resources, and with the expectation of larger possible gains, developing
countries will use the dispute settlement system to bring complaints against
countries that have larger rather than smaller markets for their products. ,
60
There are serious financial costs associated with any dispute before a
panel or the Appellate Body. 16 For example, there are attorneys' fees and
diplomats' wages, and the more complex the legal procedure, the higher the
costs. 62 Furthermore, there are costs associated with collecting the necessary
154 Guzman & Simmons, supra note 11, at 572-74.
155 Id.
156 Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing
Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 861, 861 (2005).
157 Guzman & Simmons, supra note 11, at 566.
158 Besson & Mehdi, supra note 11, at 9.
159 Guzman & Simmons, supra note 11, at 572.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 566.
162 Id.
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information for the case. 163 Since a trade dispute is based on a harm done to a
member state's particular industry or industries, that country must be able to
gather, prepare, and interpret that information from multiple sources to present
before the panel-which takes time and personnel.164 Of course, there is also
the possibility of having to pay experts. Finally, the parties to a case must have
a legal team that is familiar with WTO law, and the cost of maintaining such
staff would be much more burdensome to a developing country than a
developed country. 65 In fact, since the volume of trade of developing countries
is smaller, they are probably less likely to regularly file complaints and so will
have less need for a dedicated WTO legal team. 166
In the end, the theory goes, despite the transition from a power-based
system under the GATT to a rule-oriented system under the WTO, such
changes have also raised the transaction costs of dispute settlement. 167 By
preventing defendants from blocking complaints, establishing set timeframes
for cases to proceed, and providing an appellate process to review panel
decisions, the system has gotten more expensive to navigate. 168
On the other hand, there are resources available to poorer states. The
Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) has the specific mission of providing
legal assistance to poorer WTO members on matter related to WTO law,
including the DSU. 69 The ACWL is an organization independent from the
WTO that recognizes the possibility of a capacity deficiency and aims to
redress it. 170 The ACWL then would seem to help level the playing field in that
respect. The fact that developing countries win at the same rate as developed
countries also insinuates that greater capacity does not make for unequal
outcomes. At the same time, there are still other real costs besides having a
team of WTO legal experts that would seem to reduce a poor country's
willingness to participate in the system. However, a lower capacity to
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719, 721-22
(2003), available at http://faculty.georgetown.edu/mlb66/JWT.pdf.
166 Besson & Mehdi, supra note 11, at 9.
167 Gerhart & Kella, supra note 1, at 527.
168 Id. Furthermore, most international dispute settlement bodies-and the DSB in particular-
base their procedural and substantive rules on the judicial traditions of the Western states.
Barbara Marchetti, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Administration, Court, or Tertium
Genus?, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 567, 567 (2009). Western attorneys, then, would have
the advantage of being trained under such systems.
169 About Us: The ACWL's Mission, ACWL.cH, http://www.acwl.ch/e/about/theacwl's_
mission.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
170 Id.
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participate does not explain why some developing countries still file
complaints. 71 After all, if they cannot afford to participate, why would they?
Furthermore, if developing countries tend to file complaints against developed
countries because they need to maximize their gains, then why do some still
litigate against their poorer counterparts? As Part III.D discusses, Costa Rica
has actually filed the majority of its complaints against other developing
countries.
B. Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Only for the Rich
and Powerful?
Many commentators have argued extensively that the World Trade
Organization's dispute settlement system benefits the developed countries and
does little to help developing countries-citing, as evidence, statistics showing
that developed countries are disproportionately the most active participants.
17 3
Many scholars have conducted empirical studies in order to try to determine
who in fact is participating in the system, and why. One such study-conducted
by Doctor Holmes, 174 Professor Rollo,175 and Professor Young 176-- determined
that there was a correlation between the amount of participation and the volume
of global trade. 177 Those countries with the largest share of international trade
tended to be the most frequent complainants or defendants in a dispute. 178
171 See, e.g., Dispute Settlement: The Disputes, Disputes by Country/Territory, WTO.ORG
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dispu.by-country-e.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2014)
(Costa Rica with five complaints filed, Ecuador with three, Guatemala with nine, Honduras with
eight, and Thailand with thirteen).
172 Two complaints have been against Dominican Republic and two against Trinidad and
Tobago. Dispute Settlement: The Disputes, Disputes by Country/Territory, WTO.ORG,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dispuby-country-e.htm (last visited Nov. 6,
2014).
173 See, e.g., Besson & Mehdi, supra note 11; Guzman & Simmons, supra note 11; see also
supra Part III.A.
174 Dr. Peter Holmes is an economics professor at the University of Sussex, with a B.A. and
Ph.D. from Cambridge University. Dr Peter Holmes, UNIV. SUSSEX, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/
profiles/1275 (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). He is a specialist in European Economic Integration and
other global public policy issues, including the EU's relations with the WTO. Id.
175 Professor Jim Rollo is an Emeritus Professor of law from the University of Sussex. Prof
Jim Rollo, UNIV. SUSSEX, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/profiles/10597 6 (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
176 Professor Alasdair Young is currently the Associate Professor of International Affairs and
the Co-Director for the Center for European and Transatlantic Studies (CETS) at Georgia Tech's
Sam Nunn School of International Affairs. People, Alasdair Young, SAM NUNN SCHOOL INT'L
AFF., http://inta.gatech.edu/people/faculty/alasdair-young (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
177 HOLMES ET AL., supra note 16, at 21.
178 Id. By 2008, developed countries had initiated 239 out of 376 complaints. Christina L.
Davis & Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO
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The United States and the EU alone, two of the largest trading blocs,
were involved in 60% of the cases in the DSB. 17 9 Additionally, the United
States and the EU confronted each other the most frequently. 180 In fact, the
most famous and most contentious series of GATT/WTO cases were essentially
disputes between the United States and the EU. '81 Intuitively this makes sense,
since being the largest economies logically entails having the most areas of
trade in which to compete.
The study found little evidence that developing countries were in any
way "bullied" by the developed countries.18 2 Furthermore, the statistics
demonstrate that the rate at which developed countries won was roughly equal
to the rate of wins by developing countries. 1
83
One can infer from these findings that perhaps the system works as it
should. It seems only logical that the amount of participation be associated to
the percentage of total trade that a member possesses. The capacity imbalance
mentioned in Part III.A.2 also does not seem to be present in these statistics. If
developing countries can win as often as developed countries, then it appears
that having a team of dedicated WTO legal experts does not help developed
countries succeed as defendants. Greater capacity, therefore, does not allow
rich countries to escape their trade commitments.
Although the findings of Holmes, Rollo, and Young provide some
interesting statistics about the frequency at which members use the system,
there still remains the question of whether developing countries should
participate. The power and capacity theories did not sufficiently explain why
they would file complaints because those theories assume that the principal
costs and gains from a dispute are economic or political. Similarly here, the
statistics are founded on the economic concerns behind a DSB complaint-the
larger the economy the bigger the desire to participate.
Adjudication, 71 J. OF POL. 1033, 1033 (2009), available at https://www.princeton.edu/-cldavis/
files/who files.pdf. The United States and The European Union are the leading complainants. Id.
179 Turk, supra note 16, at 393.
180 HOLMES ET AL., supra note 16, at 21.
181 The Banana disputes resulted in three different cases before the GATT and WTO dispute
settlement systems that lasted for up to 20 years. European Communities - Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO.oRG, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dispu.e/casese/ds27_e.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). The case involved import restriction by
the European Community on bananas coming from Latin American countries where U.S.
companies dominated. Id. The Beef Hormones case was another case of import restrictions.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1996) (adopted Sept. 25, 2009). This time it
was beef products from the United States and Canada that the European Commission blocked
due to the use of hormones. Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.; see also Turk, supra note 16, at 386-87.
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However, economic gains from winning complaints are minimal. After
all, the consensus amongst economists seems to be that complainants rarely
benefit economically from retaliation, and in many cases where the member is
allowed to use retaliatory measures they refrain from doing so.184 As the
following Part discusses, reputation may be more significant to a country than
economic gains. Thus, even if a developing country has only a small share of
global trade, the country would benefit from bringing meritorious disputes to
improve its reputation.
C. The Reputation Factor: The Intangible Benefits of Using the Dispute
Settlement System
For a winner to truly be successful, they should in theory receive a net
gain from winning a dispute. As mentioned in Part III.A, the high cost of
litigation may be daunting to a developing country considering filing a
complaint in the DSB. 185 Also, considering the statistics that demonstrate that
the size of a member's share of global trade drives who participates, why
should a small developing economy participate in the costly dispute settlement
process? Economic gains from a dispute are likely to be minimal, so there must
be a bigger motivator. The answer as to why a developing country should
participate is to build its reputation.
Matthew Turk claims that reputational effects best explain why
complainants tend to win. 186 His article seeks to explain why, unlike other
forms of litigation that have a 50-50 win-lose rate, WTO cases win a
remarkable 90% of the time. 187 Interestingly, this rate is persistent regardless of
the type of matter under dispute or whether the complainant is a developed or
developing country.1 88 He concludes that WTO members litigate complaints
only when they strongly believe that their particular case is clearly meritorious;
hence, this is why most cases tend to win.1 9 Furthermore, the principal concern
of why countries only bring winnable complaints is two-fold: (1) countries that
are found to have violated a previous trade commitment will lose their
reputation as a dependable trading partner, and (2) countries that bring
frivolous claims will gain a reputation of being uncooperative. 190
184 Turk, supra note 16, at 388.
185 Supra Part III.A.
186 Turk, supra note 16, at 419.
187 Id. at 387.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 387-88.
190 Id. at 388.
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Like any other cost-benefit analysis, a state must decide whether the
costs of filing a complaint exceed the expected benefits. 19 Turk argues that
reputation is a potential cost to both complainant and defendant if either loses.
Reputation in the international law arena is important because it is the basis on
which states are willing to negotiate agreement with each other. 192 For instance,
a state's reputation for living up to its obligations affects its ability to enter into
beneficial agreements with other states. 193
In more general terms, reputation is how states predict how one state
will act based on prior experience. 94 Therefore, a state that is known for
breaking its agreements will lead other states to either refrain from making
deals with it or to frame agreements with unfavorable stipulations meant to
safeguard from the likelihood of a breach. Conversely, a state with a reputation,
for example, of abiding by its trade agreements would then be considered a
reliable trading partner.' 9'
A state's decision of whether to pursue a trade dispute may, and
perhaps should, rest heavily on reputational considerations. As mentioned
previously, the economic benefits of winning a case may be negligible,' 96 yet
the reputational effects may be significant in the long term. However, concern
over loss of reputation only deals with one side of a coin-the potential loss. If
losing reputation is the primary risk in trade dispute settlement, then it follows
that the ultimate gain would be an increased reputation.
If losing a case hurts a country's reputation among current or potential
trading partners, a win should have the opposite effect. By bringing a
meritorious complaint in the dispute settlement system, a developing country is
demonstrating a desire to support the rule of law and the strength of trade
agreements. Thus, a developing country who gains a reputation as a dependable
trading partner should attract more and better trade agreements.
A reputational gain leads to other gains. Those developing countries
that participate would gain valuable knowledge of international trade law, and
as such they would be in stronger bargaining positions in future trade
negotiations. Developing countries who are embroiled in a trade dispute that
involves meritorious claims must seriously consider the potential long-term
reputational gains that could result from litigating them before the DSB.
Reputational gains for developing countries have the very real
possibility of benefitting rich countries as well. Just like businesses look for
191 Id. at 387.
192 Id. at 415.
193 id.
194 Id. at 416.
195 Id.
196 Meagher & Palmeter, supra note 2, at 1201.
2014]
27
Holliday: Development Through Trade Disputes: Building a Reputation Using t
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2014
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
reliable business partners to provide predictability, so would developed
countries want to conduct business with other countries they know will abide
by the rules. A state that seeks to enforce its rights under a trade agreement is
one that is more likely comply with other trade agreements. Additionally, by
observing how and when these developing countries file complaints, they can
predict what behavior will be permissible in the future and what will not. After
all, as stated in the introduction to this Note, "provid[ing] security and
predictability" among all trading partners is a primary goal of the WTO. '97
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, greater participation by
developing countries will provide more legitimacy to a system that is regularly
getting criticized for being unfair. Below, the case study of Costa Rica provides
an instance where experience in the system has resulted in developmental
gains. The case of Costa Rica is meant to demonstrate that the reputational
effects of participation in trade-related dispute settlement may be beneficial and
thus should be followed by developing countries.
D. Costa Rica's Participation in the DSB: An Exception to the Rule?
If only rich countries can benefit from bringing complaints in the DSB,
why should smaller ones participate? Are those countries that do simply
outliers? This Part analyzes the case of Costa Rica-a small country in the
WTO who has brought a complaint against the United States and won-and
attempts to explain what the effect of its involvement in the WTO, and the DSB
specifically, has done for its development. After a brief background of the
small Central American country, this Part demonstrates that although it is a
developing country, its involvement in the DSB demonstrates a deliberate
intention to use the system to further its development by enhancing its
reputation. This involvement has led to further development opportunities such
as an offer to join the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).
1. A Brief History of Costa Rica
Costa Rica is a small nation of only 4.5 million people but with a long
history of democratic governance, high investment in public education,
progressive environmental policies, and universal health care for all of its
citizens. 198 While civil wars, ruthless dictatorships, and stark wealth disparity
have plagued much of Latin America's history, Costa Rica has maintained a
197 McRae, supra note 5, at 4.
198 OECD, LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2011: HOW MIDDLE-CLASS Is LATIN
AMERICA? (2011), available at http://www.latameconomy.org/fileadmin/uploads/laeo/
Documents/E-bookLEo201 1-ENentier.pdf.
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stable democracy and a strong middle class.' 99 In fact, in 1949, Costa Rica
abolished its military at the end of a short civil war, 200 and as a result, Costa
Rica has been able to focus a significant portion of its national budget on
education 2 0 -spending 7% of its GDP in 2010.202 It ranked second in Latin
America for reading and scientific skills, and fourth in mathematics.
20 3
Consequently, by investing in education and enacting policies, the country has
set up an effective framework to attract knowledge-intensive Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI).
Costa Rica has had a long history with trade and FDI: since the 1600s,
when it was still a Spanish colony, it exported cocoa to South America; then in
the following two centuries it exported tobacco to other Central American
countries; and by the 1800s it was exporting coffee to other parts of the
world.20 4 Bananas are what truly placed Costa Rica in the global market as a
banana republic. 205 The establishment of large scale banana plantations by the
United Fruit Company 2°6 ensured that Costa Rica was reliant on foreign
revenue in exchange for agricultural goods. This initial FDI was more of an
international development agreement intended to develop infrastructure, by
building a railroad to transport the bananas to the ports, and resulting in the
extraction of the country's natural resources. 20 7 For Costa Rica-like many
developing countries in the 19th and 20th centuries-such exploitation FDI
199 MINISTERIO DE COMERCIO EXTERIOR, COSTA RICA: A NATURAL PARTNER FOR OECD (2012)
[hereinafter COMEX] (on file with author).
200 Tord Hoivik & Solveig Aas, Demilitarization in Costa Rica: A Farewell to Arms? 18 J.
PEACE RES. 333 (1981).
201 GARY GEREFFI, PENNY BAMBER, STACEY FREDERICK, & KARINA FERNANDEZ-STARK, DUKE
CTR. ON GLOBALIZATION, GOVERNANCE & COMPETITIVENESS, COSTA RICA IN GLOBAL VALUE
CHAINS: AN UPGRADING ANALYSIS 12 (2013), available at http://www.cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/
2013_08_20 Ch 1-ProjectIntroduction.pdf.
202 OECD, ATTRACTING KNOWLEDGE-INTENSIVE FDI To COSTA RICA: CHALLENGES AND
POLICY OPTIONS 15 (2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/dev/americas/E-book%20
FDI%20to%20Costa%20Rica.pdf
203 COMEX, supra note 199, at 36.
204 Jose Cordero & Eva Paus, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in Costa Rica:
The Unrealized Potential 2 (Working Group on Development and Environment in the Americas,
Discussion Paper No. 13, 2008), available at http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/DP13Paus_
CorderoApr08.pdf.
205 Id.
206 The United Fruit Company was a large American banana producer, distributor, and
marketer; infamous for supporting authoritarian regimes in Central and South America and
encouraging the brutal repression of any labor movements. Marcelo Bucheli, Multinational
Corporations, Totalitarian Regimes and Economic Nationalism: United Fruit Company in
Central America, 1899-1975, 50 BuS. HIST. 433 (2008).
207 Cordero & Paus, supra note 204, at 2.
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resulted in a persistent reliance on agricultural exports such as coffee, bananas,
and flowers.' °8
In recent decades, the country has taken a two-prong approach to
development: attracting high-tech, export-oriented FDI and pursuing trade
liberalization measures.209 Policy decisions in the last few decades have led to a
shift toward high-tech manufacturing and service industries.21° While bananas
and coffee are still significant export products, their share of total exports has
dropped dramatically in recent years.2 ' Furthermore, as opposed to the rest of
Latin America, during the 1990s, increases in FDI were generally a result of
large-scale privatization efforts, particularly utilities.2 12 In contrast, Costa Rica
focused most of the FDI promotion in the manufacturing sector.213
The arrival of Intel in 1996 is what put Costa Rica on the map as a
great place for high-tech FDI. The large Multinational Enterprise (MNE) chose
Costa Rica over Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, and Mexico as the location for its
newest Pentium processor assembly and testing plant, despite being offered
relatively few concessions.2 14 The plant cost around $300 million and
employed over 2,000 local employees.215 The government offered Intel
exemptions from import duties on goods used for production; exemptions on
export, sales, excise, and municipal taxes; and an exemption on corporate
income taxes for eight years.216 While offering to expand training in English
and electronics, allow more foreign air carriers to fly into the country, and
lower the cost of energy, the government offered the same to all other
companies working in its Free Trade Zones (FTZs) and did not offer any direct
subsidies to Intel. 17 In the end, although some critics downplay the direct
economic benefits that the Intel FDI had for Costa Rica, the fact is that less
than ten years later the country's exports have shifted from a majority of
agricultural products to more high-tech exports.
208 COMEX, supra note 199, at 4.
209 Cordero & Paus, supra note 204, at 1.
210 GEREFFI ET AL., supra note 201, at 12.
211 COMEX, supra note 199, at 4.
212 Cordero & Paus, supra note 204, at 3.
213 GEREFFI ET AL., supra note 201, at 12.
214 Gordon H. Hanson, Should Countries Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 9 G-24
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, at 21 (2001).
215 Id. at 20-21.
216 Id. at21.
217 Id.
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2. Costa Rica and Trade
With respect to trade measures, the Costa Rican government has
aggressively pursued Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) and actively
participates in the WTO. 18 It currently has RTAs with most of Central
America and the Caribbean; with Chile and Peru in South America; with
Canada, Mexico and the United States in North America; with the EU; and with
China and Singapore in Asia; as well as currently undergoing trade negotiations
with Colombia and South Korea.219 Its participation in the WTO has grown
significantly in the last few years. In fact, the Costa Rican Ambassador to the
WTO, Ronald Saborio Soto, is the current Chairman of the Special Session of
the DSB.22°
Despite its small size, Costa Rica has participated in a number of
disputes before the DSB.22' Costa Rica has also been a complainant in five
cases: one against the United States, two against the Dominican Republic, and
two against Trinidad and Tobago.222 Also as a third party, it has been involved
in 15 cases to date-most notably, the well-known Bananas III case brought by
the United States against the European Commission (EC) that concerned
policies that affected the import of bananas into Europe from certain
members. 223 In ten of the cases, the defendant was a G2 country. 224 Although
this is certainly not a large number of cases in comparison to larger economies,
they represent a desire to participate in the system.
The 1995 case against the United States regarding textiles is especially
significant because it goes against the theory that the dispute settlement system
dissuades developing countries from participating, and it was the first time a
small country was willing to bring a complaint against the United States. The
case involved quantity restrictions that the United States unilaterally imposed
218 GEREFFI ET AL., supra note 201, at 13.
219 Id. at 13-14. Costa Rica currently participates in the Central American Common Market
(CACM). Organization of American States, General Treaty on Central American Economic
Integration Between Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua Signed at Managua, on
13 December 1960, SICE, http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/camertoc.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
220 Current WTO Chairpersons, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/secree/
currentchairs e.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
221 Dispute Settlement: The Disputes, Disputes by Country!Territory, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dispu-by-country-e.htm (last visited Nov. 6,
2014).
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 The term "G2" refers to the United States and the EU. Turk, supra note 16, at 394. The
significance of this is that the United States and EU are the most powerful economic and political
entities in the WTO. Id.
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on imports of cotton and man-made-fiber underwear from seven different
countries, including Costa Rica. 225 The United States alleged that these
underwear imports were damaging or threatening to actually damage its
domestic underwear industry. 226
After a series of consultations, all the other countries, aside from Costa
Rica, had reached an agreement, Costa Rica filed its complaint before the DSB
claiming that the United States was in violation of the Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing (ATC).227 The choice to file the complaint, however, was not free
from internal dispute.228
Since the economic stakes seemed so low, the Costa Rican Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Embassy in Washington opposed proceeding with the
case for of fear of retaliation from the United States. 229 However, the Ministry
of Trade (COMEX), a relatively new agency,230 believed the WTO's rule-based
system was the key to a new development strategy, and that failing to take a
stance early on in the DSB would have negative consequences for its future
ability to participate. 23' Initially, members of the small agency hesitated to
undertake the complaint without support from other countries, but ultimately
the president of Costa Rica at the time, Jos6 Maria Figueres, a former member
of COMEX, decided go ahead with the dispute.
232
The legal team in COMEX-widely considered to be well-educated
but inexperienced and young--ended up litigating the case, winning both a
favorable panel decision and the subsequent appeal. As a result of the win, the
United States removed its restrictive trade measures.233 More importantly,
Costa Rica increased the perception that small countries could benefit from
WTO membership, and it gained valuable experience of the complex dispute
23
settlement system. 23 Perhaps most significantly, the country strengthened its
225 John Breckenridge, Costa Rica's Challenge to US Restrictions on the Import of
Underwear, in MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION: CASE STUDY 12, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/casestudies-e/casel2_e.htm#outcome. The other
countries were Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Thailand, and Turkey.
Id.
226 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION: 45
CASE STUDIES 178 (Peter Gallagher, Patrick Low & Andrew Stoler eds., 2005).
227 Id.
228 Id. at 181.
229 Id. at 181-82.
230 The Ministry of Trade became a formal agency in the late 1980s. Id. at 182.
231 Breckenridge, supra note 225.
232 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 226, at 182.
233 Id. at 185.
234 Id. at 186.
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reputation among WTO members, particularly the United States. 235 Costa Rica,
thus, sought to build its reputation as a leader in the WTO by demonstrating a
willingness to assert its rights under the newly signed WTO agreement
regardless of the size of its opponent.
These proactive steps to establish a visible presence in the WTO seems
to have paid off: the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) 236 has recently offered Costa Rica membership into the elite
organization. It would become only the fourth Latin American country-after
Mexico, Chile, and Colombia-to be invited to join the group whose members
generate nearly three fifths of the world's GDP.23 7
Being a part of the OECD should allow the country to accelerate its
development since it will have access to the knowledge and experience other
members of the OECD possess.238 Furthermore, the accession process into the
organization mandates that a candidate align its social and economic policies to
those the OECD has determined will promote its development. Granted, Costa
Rica's willingness to participate in a number of WTO disputes is not the only
reason why it was offered membership. The progressive FDI policies named
above, for example, also demonstrate to the OECD a desire to promote
responsible development. However, the country's ability to gain a reputation as
a reliable trading partner would seem invaluable.
Costa Rica's participation in the WTO and the dispute settlement
system has demonstrated a desire to liberalize its trade and to take an active
role in global development. Thus, in spite of its relatively small presence in the
share of global trade, the country's participation in the system seems to have
benefited its reputation.
It would follow that other smaller economies could stand to gain from
following a similar method of development through the WTO. The amount of
participation may at first be low, due to possessing a lower share of global
235 Id.
236 The stated goal of the OECD is to "promote policies that will improve the economic and
social well-being of people around the world." About, OECD.oRG, http://www.oecd.org/about/
(last visited Nov. 6, 2014). In the area of international trade, the OECD stands against
protectionism, and argues that unnecessary trade barriers negatively affect the global economic
welfare. Insights: International Trade - Protectionism, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/
insights/intemationaltrade-protectionismtariffsandotherbarrierstotrade.htm (last visited Nov. 6,
2014).
237 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), REPUBLIC OF
SLOVENIA GOV'T OFFICE FOR DEV. & EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, http://www.arhiv.svrez.gov.si/en/
areas-of work/sloveniamember of the oecd/organisation for economicco-operation and-d
evelopment-oecd/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2014); TCRN Staff, Laura Chinchilla Excited About
OECD Invitation for Costa Rica, THE COSTA RICA NEWS (June 3, 2013),
http://thecostaricanews.com/laura-chinchilla-excited-about-oecd-invitation-for-costa-rica/1 5611.
238 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), supra note 237.
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trade, yet as their reputations for being reliable trading partners grow, there is a
greater likelihood of negotiating much more beneficial trade agreements that
would spur development in the long run. Thus, developing countries with
legitimate claims should not shy away from presenting trade disputes before the
DSB for fear of retaliation; such claims may in fact raise their reputation and
promote their development.
IV. CONCLUSION
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is perhaps one of the most
interesting public international law fora for many reasons: it is one of the most
active tribunals; it possesses characteristics, like compulsory jurisdiction and a
permanent Appellate Body, which are unique among international courts; it has
one of the highest plaintiff win rates of any court; and its binding decisions
result in a significant level of compliance. Despite all these features, the system
is often criticized for not fulfilling its role: that of "'serv[ing] to preserve the
rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements and to clarify
the existing provisions of those agreements.'
239
The arguments are that it is too biased against developing countries or
that the remedies it offers are largely ineffective. Although most commentators
have admitted that the power imbalance between rich and poor countries-or
the threat of political and economic retaliation-is not a true factor to
determine the effectiveness of the system, many still argue that the disparity in
capacity-the financial, human, and institutional resources needed to
participate-still negatively impacts a smaller country's ability to participate.
Furthermore, there are those commentators who point out that the dispute
settlement system is more widely used by the rich, but that does not explain
why developing countries use it at all.
In the end, however, the fact remains that the WTO is the most active
tribunal, and although the most frequent participants are the wealthiest
economies, smaller countries still participate. As this Note contends, the one
largely-ignored reason why WTO members participate is to gain one intangible
asset-reputation. As Turk maintains, it is reputational cost and benefits that
determines whether or not a member will file a complaint through to the end.24°
239 McRae, supra note 5, at 4 (quoting Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes art. 3.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1126)
240 See Turk, supra note 16.
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DEVELOPMENT THROUGH TRADE DISPUTES
At the same time, gains in reputation come with their own benefits. If
developing countries were to use the system as a method of establishing their
presence as active participants in the global trading system, they would likely
find other opportunities of development as a result.
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